Varieties of Assertion
Welbourne sees that the truth-value of claims about an assertion can depend on whether it is described factively e.g. as letting know, or nonfactively, e.g. as telling ([8], p. 240). But the choice of description is wider than this. We can also describe an assertion factively as reminding, admitting or confessing, or non-factively, as claiming, contending, insisting, controverting or denying. We can even describe it anti-factively as misinforming -but not as lying, which is non-factive, since liars sometimes inadvertently tell the truth.
The primary aim of a liar is to get his hearer to believe what he says. In order to establish the authority needed to achieve this, he also has a secondary aim to be taken to be sincere. So lies fit Baldwin's account of primary intention but not Jones's or Welbourne's, since liars do not intend to impart knowledge, unlike teachers. By contrast, the assertions of a sincere teacher cannot be explained by Baldwin, because they do not normally need to intend their sincerity to be taken as such (cf. [8], p. 240 
I will admit that I don't pretend to have anything as strong as knowledge, but nonetheless my conviction is firm. My aim in (I) is not to share belief or knowledge, but to remain divided in belief. In (II) and (III), my aim is not to impart knowledge, since I know, in (II), that you already have it, and in (III), that I don't have it. So in each case (J1), which Welbourne accepts, and (B1) are false, and in (I), (B3) is false.
So these assertions do not have the primary (nor for Baldwin, the secondary) intentions that each three think are necessary. They cannot be dismissed as abnormal, since Moorean assertions made by liars, provocateurs, or claimants of belief without knowledge do not cease to be absurd, especially since the hearer is rarely in a position to know the correct description of the assertion. It is mistaken to think that because the content of a belief could be true, it would be possible to believe it correctly. Although (a) is a possible truth that can be believed, it cannot be true if it is believed. If I believe it, then I believe that p, for to believe a conjunction is to believe its conjuncts. But then (a) is false, since its second conjunct is false. By contrast, (against [2], p. 54) I can correctly believe (b), since my belief that p is consistent with its second conjunct if I hold contradictory beliefs, one of which is therefore incorrect.
Believing the Speaker

Although the crux of Moorean absurdity is the idea of believing the speaker, Welbourne analyses it incorrectly. (W2) is not necessary for your believing me. Since understand and recognize are both factive verbs, (W2) is necessary only if (B) is necessary, given that I don't have intentions that
So a Moorean believer is irrational because he is committed to the necessity of at least one incorrect belief.1 And a Moorean assertor entitles a hearer to make that criticism. The hearer may not be able to make it, since he may be unable to locate that commitment, nor may he be correct in To conclude, the unified solution is that if both parties are minimally rational then a Moorean assertor is unbelievable, and then a would-be Moorean believer cannot believe the content of the assertion. The differentiated solution is that a Moorean assertor either cannot be rationally believed, or cannot be believed to be rational; and a Moorean believer is irrational either because his belief cannot be correct, or because it entails incorrect belief.2 National University of Singapore 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 0511 phijnw@leonis.nus.sg
